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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYRAD McCONKIE and ) 
ILENE McCONKIE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, ] 
v . 
FLOID C. HARTMAN and ) 
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-
[ Casf 
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McCONKIE L-A ILENE McCONKIE, Plaintiffs Appellants . 
INSERTION TO BE MADE ON PAGE 13 AFTER 
PARAGRAPH ENDING WITH QUOTATION FROM SMITH V. 
EDWARDS and BEFORE PARAGRAPH BEGINNING WITH 
"IT IS EVIDENT " 
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PROPOSITION THAT: 
FRAUD APPEARING OF RECORD AND PRACTICED 
ON ONE HOLDING AN EXISTING INTEREST IN LANDS 
TOLLS THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
UNTIL ACTUAL DISCOVERY AND TPAT RECORD NOTICE 
DOES NOT AFFORD NOTICE TO ONE HOLDING AN 
EXISTING INTEREST. 
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE 
PROPOSITION ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
STOCKLASSA V. KINNAMAN, 269 P.2 1080, at 
•1081-1082, (OKL. 1928) WHEREIN THE COURT STATED: 
"No duty res ts upon the grantee to examine 
the records with reference to the ti t le of the land 
after it was purchased, and hence the public 
record thereof is not such constructive notice as 
will set the statute of limitations in motion in an 
action for relief on the ground of fraud.***** 
In the instant c a s e , plaintiff read his deed 
after it was executed and acknowledged. He saw 
it delivered to the escrow holder, no doubt, for 
the purpose of putting it beyond the control of 
his grantor. The deed conformed to the agreement 
-2-
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at that time, and plaintiff had a right to rely 
on its remaining in that form. The deed*was 
first received by the bank, and sent to be 
recorded by it at the directions of plaintiff. The 
evidence does not disclose that the bank had any 
information as to how the deed was to be drawn. 
The deed was returned to the benk, and kept there 
until February or March, 1924, at which time some 
one who desired to purchase the mineral rights on 
said land informed plaintiff of the reservat ion. 
Plaintiff lived some distrance from Shawnee where 
the cieed was kept , and never saw it until he 
received the information about it containing the 
reservation, and, so far as the evidence d i s -
c l o s e s , he had no occasion to go to inspect the 
deed, until in February or March, 1924. We are 
aware of the former holding of this court that 
fraud is usually deemed to have been discovered 
within the statute of limitations when, in the 
exercise of reasonable di l igence, it could have 
been discovered. This merely means that one 
cannot shut his eyes to obvious fac ts , or, where 
he has information or knowledge, which, if 
pursued with reasonable di l igence, would lead to 
a discovery of the true fac t s . " 
AGAIN IN,FLOWERS V, STANLEY, 316 P.2d 840, 
at 847 (OKL. 1957) THE COURT STATED: 
"Where no duty is imposed by law on a 
. person to make inquiry, and where under the 
circumstances a prudent man would not be put 
-3-
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on inquiry, the mere fact that means of know-
ledge are open to a plaintiff and he has not 
availed himself of them do not debar him from 
relief when thereafter he shall make actual d i s -
covery. In order to warrant a denial of recovery 
to a person who has been defrauded, the 
circumstances must have been such that inquiry 
became a positive duty and failure to make the 
inquiry was an omission of a du ty . " 
IN HOLLAND V. MORETON, 353 P. 2 
989 at 993 (UTAH 1960) THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATED: 
"The averment that the plaintiffs had notice 
by the recordation of Moreton's deed is unsound. 
It imparts notice only to parties who have some 
duty to search the record, such as purchasers or 
others acquiring a subsequent interest in the 
property." 
FINALLY, IN GATES V. KANSAS FARMERS UNION 
ROYALTY CO, 111 P2d 1098, AT 1103-1104 (KANSAS 1941) 
THE COURT STATED: 
"Appellants point out that the deed was 
recorded November 24, 1930, and they s t ress the 
contention that plaintiffs, by examining the 
recorded deeds any time after they were 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
recorded could have ascertained the fact that 
by them a share of the mineral rights passed to 
the.Flag Oil Company, hence could have learned 
that fact much earlier than two years before the 
action was brought* In support of this argument 
they cite many of our ca ses in which it has been 
held in effect that the recording of a fraud-
ulent deed is constructive notice of the fraud 
rk -k -k -k "k 
Even if this contention were held to be well 
taken we think it would be of no avail to 
appellants in this Cdse because there are three 
groups of fraudulent representat ions found by the 
court to which the principle would not apply. 
Each of the ca ses cited by appellants may be 
dist inguished from the one before u s . None of 
the ca se s was brought by the owner of property 
who had executed a deed thereto^to set it as ide 
because of the fraudulent inclusion therein of the 
name of a grantee. An owner of real property is 
hot bound in such a way as to start the running oJ 
the statute of limitations by the constructive 
notice of the recording of a deed to which his 
name as grantor has been.forged (Cox v.. Watkins 
149 Kan. 209, 87 P.2d 243); neither is the 
recording of a deed executed by the owner of a 
property constructive notice to the grantor of the 
fact that there had been fraudulently included in 
the deed a description of property other than that 
which the grantor hod intended to convey so as 
to start the running of the statute of l imitat ions. 
"k "k "k -k 
Normally an owner of the property who 
executes a deed therefor has no occasion to 
examine the record after the deed is recorded 
-5-
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to ascer ta in if a fraud has been committed upon 
him by the inclusion of additional real property or 
an additional grantee . Certainly we think that 
would be true in the absence of any fact or 
circumstances which would cause a reasonably 
prudent grantor to suspect fraud practiced upon 
him in that manner." 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L Y R A D McCONKIE and \ 
I L E N E McCONKIE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, I 
i Case No. 13614 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants 
P R E L I M I N A R Y S T A T E M E N T 
All italics are ours and are added for emphasis. 
The parties will he referred to as in the Trial Court. 
"R" refers to Record and "TR." refers to Transcript 
of Record. . • / • 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
The Plaintiffs instituted action in three counts 
seeking in the alternative: (1) Reformation of Deed of 
Conveyance to comply with provisions of contract of 
i 
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sale; (2) Decree of Quiet Title in Plaintiffs, and (3) 
Specific Performance of Uniform Real Estate Contract 
based on Fraudulent Conveyance. 
The Defendants asserted that they had performed 
the contract and that in any event the Plaintiffs were 
not entitled to relief because of laches and the Statute 
of Limitations. 
DISPOSITION I N L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a 
jury, the Honorable J . Robert Bullock, presiding. At 
the conclusion of trial and argument of counsel the trial 
Court rendered its Memorandum Decision holding the 
Plaintiff's action was barred by reason of the Statute of 
Limitations (R. 71-72). Thereafter Plaintiffs filed a 
Motion for a New Trial (R. 73-90) which was denied 
(R. 103). 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiffs' appeal from the Judgment of the Trial 
Court denying their Motion for a New Trial or in the 
alternative that the Judgment of the Lower Court be 
reversed and Judgment ordered for Plaintiffs or that a 
New Trial be ordered. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The Plaintiffs are residents of Duchesne County, 
State of Utah, and reside at Altamont, Utah (TR. 9). 
2 
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The property which is the subject to this suit con-
sists of three separate parcels of land near Altamont, 
Utah, and comprise a total of 292 acres. (Exhibits 
"Pltf. #2" and "Pltf. #3") (TR. 10-11). 
On March 19, 1959, the Defendants entered into 
a contract to sell a major portion of the subject prop-
erties to Arthello Clark, et ux, and Richard D. Titen-
sor ,et ux, excepting an 80 acre tract (W. y% of SE 
}4 of Sec. 1, T 2 So., Range 4 West, Uintah Special 
Meridian), which sale also included personal property 
and livestock (TR. 128). This contract did not con-
tain any mineral reservations (Ex. "Def. no. 6") (TR. 
17, 59, 60,103, 104, 106, 110). 
Notwithstanding the omission of the 80 acre tract 
in the original contract of March 19, 1959, the buyers 
occupied and farmed the total 292 acre tract (TR. 
107), and sometime later filed suit against the Hart-
mans, Defendants in this action, for various alleged 
misrepresentations in the contract. This action is identi-
fied as Civil No. 3389 in the District Court of Duchesne 
County, Utah, which action the Trial Court took 
judicial notice of. The issues in this suit were still un-
resolved at the time Plaintiffs began negotiations to 
acquire the subject properties (TR. 67, 107, 108). 
On or about September 20th to 25th, 1960, the 
Plaintiffs executed an "Agreement of Purchase" to 
acquire the interests of the Clarks and Titensors in the 
292 acres of land (Ex. "Def. no. 4") (TR. 22, 23). 
This was later reduced to a more formal agreement on 
or about October 31, 1960 (TR. 25) (Ex. Def. no. 
3 
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5"). Prior to executing any Agreement of Purchase 
the Plaintiffs in this action had seen the original con-
tract of March 19, 1959, and were aware that no min-
eral reservations were contained therein (TR. 60). 
Following preliminary negotiations and contacts 
between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, the Hart-
mans, Clarks, Titensors, and McConkies met at the 
First Security Bank at Roosevelt ,Utah, to conclude 
the matters relating to purchase of the subject prop-
erties by the Plaintiffs (TR. 63-65). Hartmans and 
Clarks had not yet resolved all differences and were 
engaged in a long conference at the Bank on that date 
trying to resolve various issues while Mr. McConkie 
was kept waiting in the lobby of the Bank (TR. 63-
65, 110, 111). Late in the afternoon of that date Mr. 
Hartman emerged from the conference and suggested 
to Mr. McConkie that a new contract be drafted be-
tween the Hartmans and McConkies which would in-
crease the interest rate permissible for mortgages 
which could be maintained on the subject properties 
and would reflect the new terms and conditions of sale 
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants for the land 
only. Mr. McConkie acquiesced in this proposal and 
the new contract was drafted and executed by the 
Parties to this suit (TR. 67-69, 73-75, 114-117) (Ex-
hibit "Pltf. #1") . 
During the negotiations at the Bank on November 
1, 1960, the Hartmans were represented by counsel, 
George Stewart of Roosevelt, Utah, and gave instruc-
tions relative to the preparation of the Uniform Real 
4 
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Estate Contract (Ex. "Pltf. no. 1") (TR. 115, 116, 
128). At no time did Defendants ever inform Plain-
tiffs that mineral rights were to be reserved or that 
they claimed any of the mineral interests in the land 
(TR. 125-127). 
The Defendant, Moid Hartman, had held a real 
estate license and was conversant with Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts and matters pertaining to conveyanc-
ing (TR. 128). 
The McConkies, Plaintiffs in the subject action, 
took possession of the subject properties in October of 
1960, and occupied and possessed said premises there-
after exclusively and paid all taxes assessed thereon 
(TR. 11, 12). On May 15, 1970, Plaintiffs sold a one-
half acre tract of the subject properties to their son-in-
law and on February 13, 1967, they sold 160 acres of 
the subject property located in Section 32, to one Roy 
Warren by Warranty Deed (TR. 11, 12, 52) (Ex. 
"Def.no. 12"). 
On December 8, 1961, the Defendants, without 
notice to or knowledge on the part of the Plaintiffs 
prepared or caused to be prepared and executed two 
Warranty Deeds covering the subject properties which 
Deeds reserved to the Grantors various mineral rights, 
which are still owned by Defendants (TR. 134-135) 
(Pltfs. Ex. no. 2 and 3). On the same date that the 
Deeds were prepared the Defendants caused the same 
to be deposited with the First Security Bank at Roose-
velt, Utah, and gave no notice thereof to the Plaintiffs. 
(TR. 119, 120, 134). The Plaintiffs had no knowledge 
5 
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of the existence of the two Deeds which had been placed 
in Escrow by the Defendants, and did not receive or 
learn of the contents and reservations of said instru-
ments until sometime within a year after 1970 with 
reference to Exhibit no. 2, and within a year prior to 
the trial of this case as to Exhibit no. 3 (TR. 12-16). 
Plaintiffs performed under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract of November 1, 1960, until approximately 
February, 1964, at which time they negotiated a new 
mortgage loan with Travelers Insurance Company and 
made arrangements to pay the Defendants the balance 
due them for the subject properties. The Defendants 
at that time instructed the First Security Bank with 
reference to the unpaid balance agreed upon with the 
Plaintiffs and authorized a final settlement of the 
Escrow (TR. 120, 121). At no time did Defendants 
ever discuss the reservation of mineral rights with the 
Plaintiffs or notify the Plaintiffs of same (TR. 126, 
127). 
The Travelers Insurance Company had requested 
that the title insurance work to be performed in con-
junction with their mortgage loan be conducted by 
Security Title Company (TR. 36-39). On or about 
the latter part of February, 1964, a representative of 
the Security Title Company by the name of Anderson 
called at the home of the Plaintiffs and obtained the 
signatures of the Plaintiffs on the various mortgage 
loan documents required by Travelers Insurance Com-
pany (TR. 43). Thereafter the representative of the 
title insurance company concluded the mortgage loan 
6 
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transaction for the Travelers Insurance Company (TR. 
46, 47, 48) and the Defendants were paid the sums 
due to them for the balance of the purchase price of 
the property. The two Warranty Deeds covering the 
subject properties (Pltfs. Ex. no. 2 and Pltfs. Ex. no. 
3) were recorded in the Office of the County Recorder 
of Duchesne County, State of Utah, on the 26th day 
of February, 1964. Neither of these Deeds were re-
turned to the Plaintiffs nor did they have any knowl-
edge of the contents or reservations thereof until 1970 
or thereafter as stated above (TR. 12-16). The Plain-
tiffs believed that title of the premises would be held 
by the Mortgagee until the mortgage was paid in full 
(TR. 50, 55). In October of 1972, the Plaintiffs 
through counsel, directed a Demand Letter to the 
Defendants requesting that they convey the mineral 
interests which had been reserved contrary to the pro-
visions of the contract, and this Demand was rejected. 
(TR. 7 and 8). Following the rejection of the demand 
the Plaintiffs instituted this suit. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
F R A U D A P P E A R I N G OF RECORD AND 
P R A C T I C E D ON ONE H O L D I N G AN E X I S T -
I N G I N T E R E S T I N LANDS TOLLS T H E 
R U N N I N G OF T H E S T A T U T E OF L I M I T A -
TIONS U N T I L A C T U A L DISCOVERY. 
7 
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The general effect of fraud upon the running of 
the statutory period in most, if not all, jurisdictions 
" . . . is that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of 
action from the one to whom it belongs, but the one 
against whom it lies, constitutes an implied exception to 
the statute of limitations, postponing the commence-
ment of the running of the statute until discovery or 
reasonable opportunity of discovery of the fact by the 
owner of the cause of action." 51 Am. Jur., 2d Section 
147, p. 717, see also Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 
Utah 426; 73 P.2d 1277; Also, Esponda v. Ogden State 
Bank, 283 P . 729, 731 (Utah 1929), wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that ". . . in the case of fraud, the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
fraud is discovered by the injured person." See 51 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Section 147, at p. 717, wherein the rule is stated 
that the statutory period begins to run ". . . from the 
time when the facts were discovered or should with rea-
sonable diligence have been discovered." 
What then constitutes knowledge sufficient to put 
a prudent man upon inquiry and what constitutes dili-
gence in such an inquiry? 
The jurisdictions in the United States are divided 
as to their interpretation of what constitutes diligence 
on the part of the defrauded party and what constitutes 
sufficient facts to put him upon inquiry. A minority of 
jurisdictions are of the opinion that diligence by a de-
frauded party in an action such as this means that a 
party 
8 
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" . . . is chargeable with notice of that which was 
of record, or which presumably he would have 
discovered by a diligent investigation prosecuted 
in the light of the facts of record, whether or not 
under the particular circumstances reasonable 
diligence would have led to an examination of 
the records. When the rule intended to be laid 
down by the cases is merely a rule of diligence, 
propositions with reference to matters of record 
add little to it, since, of course, where reasonable 
diligence requires a search of public records, the 
party would be chargeable with what in the exer-
cise of such diligence is something distinct from, 
and in addition to, the rule of diligence, it charges 
with notice regardless of whether under the cir-
cumstances an ordinarily diligent person would 
have examined the records, and does so wholly 
without regard to whether or not anything had 
come to the knowledge of the defrauded party of 
a character to put him on inquiry. Those courts 
which have at times laid down this more rigorous 
rule of record notice have experienced some dif-
ficulty in adhering to it, because it is a rule of 
thumb, rather than a live principle of law, and it 
takes no account of the numerous forms in which 
fraud may appear and its varied devices and cir-
cumstances of concealment" 37 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Fraud and Deceit, Section 411, pp. 558, 599. 
(Emphasis added) 
The majority rule, however, although no Utah 
cases have been found directly on this point, is: 
". . . taken as a whole, the cases justify the con-
clusion that for purposes of the running of the 
statute of limitations, a distinction is to be ob-
served as between cases where the fraud was in-
volved in a transaction wherein title or rights 
9 
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were acquired by the defrauded party (or would 
have been acquired but for the fraud) and cases 
where the fraud was practiced on an owner with 
reference to property held by him. Thus, when 
the ground of recovery relied on is the commis-
sion of a fraudulent act, and it appears that facts 
showing or sufficiently suggesting the fraud 
were of public record at the time plaintiff ac-
quired the title or rights to which the fraud re-
lates (or would have acquired them but for the 
fraud), the ruling made, under most circum-
stances, is that the records are to be regarded as 
constituting sufficient notice of the fraud to start 
the running of the statute. But ordinarily, rea-
sonable diligence does not require that one hav-
ing no cause of suspicion shall examine the public 
records to determine whether or not others have 
committed acts of fraud affecting his existing 
property or rights, and accordingly, as to fraud 
of that character, it is usually held that the public 
records alone are not such notice as will start the 
running of the statute." 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud 
and Deceit, Section 412, pp. 560-561 (Emphasis 
added). 
I t is evident from studying the decisions of the 
copious jurisdictions which adhere to this latter rule that 
for the period to begin running the circumstances must 
be such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence 
the probability that he has been defrauded, Warner v. 
Republic Steel Corporation, 103 F . Supp. 998 at 1009 
(1952), and in that regard it is important to note that 
these same jurisdictions hold that the fact that an in-
vestigation would have revealed the falsity of a mis-
representation will not alone bar recovery by the in-
jured party. Schaefer v. Berinstein, 4 Cal. Rptr. 236 
10 
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(1961). Some courts have even gone so far as to hold 
that when fraud is involved, public records do not con-
stitute constructive notice to a defrauded party even 
though he may have had some reason to check the rec-
ords. See Gross v. Needham, 7 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1961). 
See also Bush v. Stone, 500 S.W.2d 885 at 891 
(Texas, 1973), where the Texas court stated that: 
"the mere fact that the plaintiff had the oppor-
tunity or power to investigate the fraud is not 
sufficient in law to charge him with knowledge. 
The defrauded party must be cognizant or aware 
of facts as would have caused the ordinarily intel-
ligent and prudent man to investigate. Where, as 
here, a party is guilty of an affirmative fraudu-
lent misrepresentation of a fact, he should not be 
permitted to urge that the defrauded party could 
have discovered the truth had he diligently made 
an investigation." 
The California courts have spoken on the issue of 
constructive notice many times. In the case of Sime v. 
Malowf, 212 P.2d 946 (1950), the Second District 
Court of Appeals For California stated, at page 960, 
that for the rule of constructive notice to run 
". . . there must appear in the nature of the case 
such a connection between the facts discovered 
and the further facts to be discovered that the 
former may be said to furnish a reasonable and 
natural clue to the latter. Circumstances that are 
dubious or equivocal are not sufficient to take 
the place of actual notice. * * * The rule imputes 
notice only of those facts that are naturally and 
reasonably connected with the facts known, and 
of which the known fact or facts can be said to 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
furnish a clue. I t does not impute notice of every 
conceivable fact and circumstance however re-
mote which might come to light by exhausting all 
possible means of knowledge. * * * The circum-
stances must be such that further inquiry is an 
imperative duty, and failure to make it consti-
tutes a negligent omission." 
The rationale for these cases is thus apparent, i.e., 
constructive notice constitutes notice only to those who 
would have a need or interest to check the record. Once 
certain facts are present, e.g., a proposed purchase of 
property, a hint of fraud, etc., such circumstances as 
these would cause a reasonably prudent man to search 
the record. However, a person who is holding an exist-
ing interest in a piece of land, who has no reason to be-
lieve fraud has been committed, is under no obligation 
to continually return to the recorder's office to check 
the record on his property to make sure no fraud has 
been perpetrated since he obtained his interest. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado has also adopted 
this reasoning. In the case of Greco v. Pullava, 444 P.2d 
383, at 384 (Colo. 1968), the court stated that 
"in some jurisdictions a fraudulent conveyance 
of real estate is conclusively presumed to be dis-
covered, therefore constituting notice, when the 
fraudulent conveyance is filed for record. * * * 
However, in Colorado the record of a Deed of 
Trust or other instrument is notice only to those 
persons claiming under the same chain of title 
who are bound to search for it." 
See also Smith v. Russell, 20 Colo. App. 554, 80 P . 474; 
Fish v. East, 114 F . 2d 177 (10th Cir.). Again, to re-
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iterate, a person holding an interest is under no obliga-
tion, absent something putting him on notice, to check 
on a periodic basis his chain of title. The case of Smith 
v. Edwards, 82 Utah 244, 27 P.2d 264 (1932), gives 
support to the rationale for the above mentioned deci-
sions. The Court in that case at page 270, in quoting 
with approval from Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 112 
1130, 72 N W 838, states that 
"to ascertain what constitutes a discovery of 
the facts constituting the fraud reference must 
be had to principles of equity. * * * Hence, in 
actions in equity, the rule was that the means of 
knowledge are equivalent to actual knowledge; 
that is, that a knowledge of the facts would have 
put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry 
which, if followed up, would have resulted in a 
discovery of fraud, was equivalent to actual dis-
covery." (Emphasis Added) 
I t is evident from these authorities that the purpose 
of the recording acts is to put prospective buyers, credi-
tors, etc., on notice and is not to give notice to those hold-
ing existing interests in the property. 
An additional problem with this issue with which 
we are here concerned is whether or not the Plaintiff is 
charged with notice by virtue of the notice to Security 
Title Company and/or Travelers Insurance Company. 
I t was shown by the evidence presented that no agency 
relationship existed between either Security Title Com-
pany or Travelers, and the Plaintiff. 
Does then notice to a third party known by Plain-
tiff but who is not an agent constitute notice to the 
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Plaintiff? This has been answered in the negative by 
Madsen v. Madsen, et al, 72 Utah 96, 269 P . 132 
(1928), wherein the third party was an independent 
contractor where no agency existed. 
The Court therein stated and held that: 
"Appellant contends that knowledge on the 
part of the stray gatherer of Appellant's posses-
sion of Respondent's sheep was notice of that fact 
to Respondent and regardless of all other con-
siderations, the statute of limitations ran from 
the date of such notice; giving the testimony its 
most favorable interpretation in that regard we 
cannot so hold. H e was a stray gatherer for both 
parties to this suit, for other sheep men and his 
field of activity seems to have been limited only 
to the territory which he might be able to cover. 
H e was an individual contractor, merely, and no-
tice to an independent contractor does not bind 
the principle." 
In summarizing this point, I should like to refer to 
one final, important statement in 137 A L R at 272 
wherein the authors state the general rule on this point 
as follows: 
". . . a purchaser of property or of a claim 
thereon is, ordinarily, for purposes of statutes of 
limitations, charged with notice of facts of record 
bearing on the truth of representations made by 
the seller in reference to title or encumbrances, 
since prudence usually requires a purchaser to 
consult the records as to such matters at the time 
of making his purchase . . .; but it is not so plain 
that where one has once acquired property or 
rights he must in all circumstances refer to the 
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records to determine whether or not fraud, 
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, 
has deprived him thereof . . ." (Emphasis add-
ed). 
CONCLUSION 
I t is evident from the facts that the Plaintiff, Mr. 
McConkie, at no time had any reason to believe because 
of any representations, actions or otherwise by the De-
fendants or any other party that the Defendants were 
adversely or fraudulently claiming any reserved min-
eral interests in the subject property. H e therefore, had 
no need nor occasion to inquire into the status of the in-
terests of the various parties which were on record. 
Plaintiff at no time had any indication or warning 
from any source that the recorded interest was contrary 
to the interest which he had negotiated, acquired and 
agreed to in the contract and we therefore respectfully 
submit that the statutory period should not have com-
menced to run until the occasion or warning did arise 
which caused him to examine the record. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brant H . Wall 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I hereby Certify that two (2) copies of the fore-
going Brief of Appellant tym mailed to Ray, Quinney 
& Nebeker (L. Ridd Larson), Attorneys at Law, 400 
Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, postage pre-
paid, this .... day of June, 1974. 
Brant H . Wall 
Attorney 
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